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ABORTION: AN ENVIRONMENTAL 
CONVENIENCE OR A CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT? 
By Mitchell]. Sikora, ]r:~ 
INTRODUCTION 
In short it is difficult to conceive any check to population, which 
does not come under the description of some species of misery and 
vice. l 
Anticipating global population crisis in 1798, Thomas Malthus 
seemed to have ample cause for his pessimism. To him policies 
of population control appeared limited to reliance upon the more 
miserable and vicious of human and natural forces. To curb the 
differential in growth rates between population and food, and 
thereby to preserve the "subsistence" standard of living, the 
gloomy parson was forced to repose special faith in the inexorable 
cycles of war, pestilence, natural disaster and famine. If these 
solutions seemed self-defeating, they must also have appeared 
exhaustive and inevitable. 
The modern revival of Malthusian concern has not brought 
with it the same dark prospects for cure. While the parson's 
catalogue of "preventive" measures was confined to "restraint 
from marriage," the contemporary demographer contemplates 
positive measures of population control far more therapeutic 
than Malthus' sinister quartet. 
The cycles of attrition have given way to methods of birth 
control, i.e., to contraception and abortion, although the con-
comitant legal and moral debate retains much of the parson's 
original phraseology. As a means of birth and population control 
the mutiple forms of contraception require little explanation. 
However, since contraceptive development, abortion has become 
a far more qualified and less necessary form of birth control. 
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Most legal commentators do not characterize abortion as a 
feasible method of mass birth control in the United States.2 
Still, abortion remains a significant environmental issue for a 
number of reasons. First, although it yields to contraception as 
the primary method of population control, it has become a 
secondary or supplementary method, often influencing the success 
of contraceptive policies in the first instance and ultimately the 
resulting birth rate. Throughout the world women intent upon 
smaller families turn to abortion when contraception has been 
unavailable or ineffective.3 And in countries with permissive 
abortion laws women still tend "to rely on early, safe, compara-
tively cheap abortions rather than undergo the trouble, expense 
and, to some minds, the dangers of contraceptives .... Aside 
from these women, there are those who would choose cure rather 
than prevention under any circumstances; they might not use 
the perfect contraceptive should it ever be developed."4 The 
ready availability of legal abortion, then, may actually retard 
the progress of contraception and promote its own use as a 
means of birth con trol. 
Second, abortion remains a universal means of "personal," 
if not mass, population control5 initiated by the mother to govern 
the size of her family and the consequent quality of its life. 
Obviously it constitutes a determinant of the environment of 
the family choosing it. Moreover, the policy of permissive 
abortion laws is to recognize "socioeconomic indications" as 
legitimate grounds for abortion.6 These grounds typically involve 
consideration of the impact of the additional child upon the 
welfare of the individual family. 
Third, one must respect the sheer magnitude of abortion, legal 
and illegal, global and national, as a massive health problem 
both for the mothers aborted and the medical resources available 
or still unavailable. Popular sources estimate that in the United 
States in 1969 over one million women underwent abortion, that 
about 350,000 of these needed hospital care when they attempted 
to abort themselves, and that more than 8,000 women died from 
self-induced abortion. 7 Legal commentators report analogous 
statistics for the 1960's. Mishandled criminal abortions are esti-
mated to have caused 10,000 deaths per year during that period. 8 
The vast majority of these women were married and already 
mothers. 9 Legal hospital abortions accounted for the termination 
of only 8,000 to 9,000 pregnancies annually.10 Simultaneously 
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from 250,000 to two million annual illegal abortions were per-
formed within the United StatesY 
The most recent authoritative estimates place the number of 
annual abortions, legal and illegal, throughout the world at 30 to 
35 million. l2 Estimates vary widely on figures within the United 
States. The generally settled figure for annual legal abortions is 
presently 8,000.13 But estimates of illegal abortion run from about 
200,000 to about 1 million per year. Proponents of liberalized 
abortion laws typically cite the higher calculations of criminal 
abortion and resultant death,l4 The most conservative reliable 
death figure has been set at about 500 per year. l5 And the most 
reliable estimate of annual unwanted births ranges from 750,000 
to one million.l6 Yet even after one has allowed for the preferred 
uses of unverifiable estimates, he need only look to the cautious 
approximation of 200,000 illegal abortions, 500 resultant deaths, 
and 750,000 unwanted births to appreciate the gravity of illegal 
abortion as a national health concern. 
Only in the last two years has abortion been transformed into 
a legal controversy of potentially constitutional magnitude. 
Litigants pressing for the relaxation or abolition of restrictive 
abortion laws have marshalled constitutional arguments on 
several fronts. The foremost contention is that a woman has a 
fundamental but unenumerated right of procreative self determi-
nation, a constitutional right to choose whether and when to give 
birth in order to con trol the size and spacing of her family. Conse-
quently the legislature might regulate such a basic freedom for 
only a compelling and overriding state interest. 
Additional arguments attack the operation of typical state 
laws. Almost all states have traditionally permitted abortion as 
necessary to preserve the life of the mother, and a few as neces-
sary to preserve the life or the health of the mother. The common 
statutory language "necessary to preserve the life [or health] of 
the mother," or its equivalent, has been under mounting assault 
as an unconstitutionally vague and overboard restriction. It 
has been argued unsuccessfully that such a standard of criminal-
ity does not adequately guide a doctor confronted by a request 
for abortion and that it infringes unnecessarily upon a woman's 
fundamental right to abortion. 
Another constitutional thrust is that restrictive abortion law is 
inevitably discriminatory in its impact, that it denies equal pro-
tection of the law to those, especially the poor, lacking the funds 
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and the information to procure a justifiable abortion. Such 
women must either go without an abortion or undergo the haz-
ards of an illegal and often incompetent abortionY 
As of the beginning of the 1970 Term the United States Su-
preme Court had on at least eight occasions declined to review 
state court decisions involving restrictive abortion statutes,l8 
During the Term the Court with apparent finality resolved one 
of the major constitutional issues at hand; it held the typical 
statute permitting abortion only for the purpose of preserving 
the woman's life or health not to be unconstitutionally vague.19 
As of the moment, however, the ultimate issue whether a woman 
possesses a constitutional right to an abortion remains unresolved. 
The Court currently carries on its docket three cases affording 
the opportunity for adjudication of this conclusive question.20 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY 
Abortion in antiquity seems to have been a familiar medical 
practice but a variant legal matter.21 The early Hebrews were 
aware of abortive techniques but strongly disapproved of the 
practice.22 By contrast the Greek city states are supposed to have 
applied abortion to policies of population contro1.23 Sparta, to 
promote numbers for its military and labor forces, imposed 
severe penalties, including death, for the destruction of the em-
byro or fetus. 24 The other city states pursued more flexible popu-
lation policies.25 Plato and Aristotle approved of abortion for a 
number of social and economic purposes.26 Hippocrates generally 
discouraged the practice because of the frequent injury or death 
of the mother; and in cases where abortion was advisable he 
wan ted only physicians to perform the actY 
The Roman attitude was more relaxed and sanctioned abortion 
for population polictS and, especially in the Empire period, for 
social indications.29 The central tenet of Roman family law, con-
tinuing from the Republic into the Empire, was the absolute 
power of the father, as paterfamilias, over his family. The father 
determined the fate of the fetus, which was regarded as part of 
the woman.30 
The propagation of Christian doctrine gradually discredited 
abortion.31 The immortality of the viable fetus' soul put it in 
peril of eternal condemnation if the fetal life were terminated 
before birth and baptism. In this light abortion was equated 
with infanticide. However early canonists did not agree that the 
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soul arose in the fetus at the moment of conception. The preva-
lent view held the soul to enter the female fetus at 80 days ges-
tation, and the male fetus at 40 days.32 The distinction of ensoul-
ment produced a variance in punishment. Termination of an 
unensouled fetus (that is, of any fetus before the fortieth day) 
was punished by fine only; abortion of an ensouled fetus was 
characterized as murder and punished accordingly.33 This theory 
endured for almost a thousand years, until 1869, when Pope 
Pius IX erased the distinction and subjected abortion at any 
stage of pregnancy to the uniform punishment of excommunica-
tion. Abortion prior to ensoulment now became "anticipated 
homicide."34 The past century has brought an unbroken line of 
uncompromising papal statements to the same effect. 
The development of the common law rule records a distinction 
analogous to the canonical theory of ensoulment. At common 
law the abortion of a fetus before "quickening" (the time when 
fetal movements are first felt by the pregnant woman, usually 
coming about the fourth to fifth month) did not constitute a 
crime.35 Superseding restrictive legislation came during the nine-
teenth century to satisfy two primary motives: the legal in-
corporation of the Judeo-Christian belief in the inviolability 
of human life even in its most problematic existence; and the 
preservation of the health and life of the pregnant woman en-
dangered at the hands of incompetent abortionists and at her 
own hands in instances of hazardous self-induced abortion.36 
The legislation typically proscribed abortion at any stage of the 
pregnancy. 
In England the first such law, Lord Ellenborough's Act, was 
enacted in 1803.37 It gave way to the harsher Offenses Against 
the Person Act of 1861,38 providing for a maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment for an abortion performed before or after 
quickening. The law on its face allowed for no "indications" 
justifying abortion. It punished both the woman and the abor-
tionist. Unsuccessful attempts to abort were also subject to severe 
penalty. In practice the women themselves were seldom prose-
cuted and rarely subjected to maximum punishment. Prosecu-
tion was aimed at the "back-street surgeon."39 
A major episode in the relaxation of English law occurred with 
the 1939 landmark case of Rex v. Bourne,40 which created a 
medical and psychiatric ground for abortion under the law. 
After the rape and resulting pregnancy of a fourteen-year-old 
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girl by several soldiers, Dr. Bourne, a prominent gynecologist, 
perfomed an abortion and notified the police of his action. 
Charged with a felony, he grounded his defense on the argument 
that an abortion was legally justifiable for the preservation of 
the mother's life and that no medically workable distinction 
could be drawn between the rreservation of life and of mental 
health, the specific purpose 0 that abortion. The trial judge in-
structed the jury that it was to decide the scope of the necessity 
to preserve life and that the government bore the burden of 
proof that the Doctor had not acted in good faith. The charge 
resulted in an acquittal and in precedent justifying abortion for 
the preservation of the mother's life and acknowledging the 
difficulty of distinction between the preservation of life and of 
health by giving generous scope to the former. Rex v. Bourne 
remained effective law until cumulative efforts for reform legis-
lation produced the British Abortion Act of 1967.41 
In the United States, Illinois passed the first restrictive statute 
in 1827.42 However the most significant early law was the New 
York act of 1829 containing the first therapeutic43 exception to 
absolute statutory prohibition. The New York statute permitted 
abortion where it was necessary to save the mother's life, and 
served as a model for the overwhelming number of American 
statutes to follow. 44 Until the modern movement for therapeutic 
abortion legislation gained appreciable force a decade ago, the 
sole statutory exception in almost every state remained the 
preservation of the life of the mother. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW 
Medical and legal advocacy of liberalized abortion law reached 
a milestone in 1962 with the promulgation of the therapeutic 
abortion provision of the American Law Institute's Model Penal 
Code. Section 230.3(2)45 defined the several specific grounds or 
"indications" for "justifiable abortion" which have since served 
as a model for reform recommendations in the various states. 
Justifiable Abortion. A licensed physician is justified in terminating 
a pregnancy if he believes there is substantial risk that continuance 
of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health 
of the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical 
or mental defect, or that the pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, 
or other felonious intercourse. All illicit intercourse with a girl below 
the age of 16 shall be deemed felonious for purposes of this subsection. 
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Justifiable abortions shall be performed only in a licensed hospital 
except in case of emergency when hospital facilities are unavailable. 
Subsection (3) imposed procedural requirements: 
No abortion shall be performed unless two physicians, one of whom 
may be the person performing the abortion, shall have certified in 
writing the circumstances which they believe to justify the abortion. 
Such certificate shall be submitted before the abortion to the hos-
pital where it is to be performed and, in the case of abortion following 
felonious intercourse, to the prosecuting attorney or the police. 
Failure to comply with any of [these] requirements gives rise to a 
presumption that the abortion was unjustified. 
Beyond the Model Code provisions, "therapeutic abortion" 
refers more generally to any abortion performed for medical 
reasons and in a hospi tal. 
Therapeutic abortion proposals and the Model Code provision 
in particular have generated considerable legal commentary, 
preponderantly favorable. 46 From 1967 through 1970 thirteen 
states adopted legislation acknowledging grounds proposed by 
the CodeY And during 1970 three states, New York, Alaska and 
Hawaii, withdrew for the most part any criminal sanctions pre-
viously applicable to physicians performing abortions in appro-
priate medical facilities. 48 Of the remainingjurisdictions, Alabama 
and Washington, D.C. permit abortion necessary to preserve the 
"health" as well as the life of the mother.49 Four states, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, New Jersey and Pennsylvania, make no express 
statutory exception to the prohibition against abortion.50 How-
ever, the Louisiana licensing provision does not punish a 
physician for aborting a woman whose life was in danger.51 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has long construed the 
statute forbidding "unlawfully" committed abortions so as to 
permit abortion where a physician acts in good faith and honest 
belief of its necessity for the preservation of the life or health 
of the woman.52 The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that a 
physician may perform an abortion to preserve the life of the 
mother, but not merely to protect her health.53 The Pennsyl-
vania statute continues to proscribe "unlawfully" performed 
abortions, but the highest court of the state has not read any 
exception into that term. An invitation to act on that statute 
has recently arisen from a lower Pennsylvania court's decision 
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and overboard and 
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that in the absence of a compelling state interest it constitutes a 
violation of the mother's constitutional right not to give birth.54 
The remaining American statutes permit abortion solely to 
preserve the life of the pregnant woman.55 
As an example of comparative law, American abortion legis-
lation ranks among the most restrictive in the world.56 Even if 
one considers the accelerating trend of reform in favor of the 
Model Act provisions, the enumerated justifications, the preser-
vation of the life and health of the woman and the prevention of 
defective birth and of the product of felonious intercourse, re-
main comparatively narrow. The British Abortion Act includes 
these justifications and, most significantly, a socioeconomic 
indication in consideration of the prospective family environ-
ment of the mother: 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be 
guilty of an offense under the law relating to abortion when a preg-
nancy is terminated by a registered medical practitioner if two 
registered medical practitioners are of the opinion, formed in good 
faith-
(a) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to 
the life of the pregnant woman, or of injury to the physical or mental 
health of the pregnant woman or any existing children of her family, 
greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or 
(b) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it 
would suffer from such physical or mental abnormalities as to be 
seriously handicapped. 
(2) In determining whether the continuance of a pregnancy would 
involve such risk of injury to health as is mentioned in paragraph 
(a) of subsection (1) of this section, account may be taken of the preg-
nant woman's actual or reasonably foreseeable environment. [Emphasis 
added.]57 
The British Act, then, provides several open-ended socio-
economic indications concerned with the overall welfare or 
"environment" of the family unit, a consideration still absent 
from American legislation, including the Model Act. In particular 
the British law takes account of the "mental health" of the 
woman, and of "any existing children of her family," and, in an 
independent clause, of the woman's "actual or reasonably fore-
seeable environment." 
To put American law in clearer perspective one might con-
sider that despite the greatly expanded indications of the 
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British statute, that law can still be characterized as a relatively 
restrictive code on the international scale.58 By contrast much 
more moderate codes are currently in force in the Scandinavian 
countries,59 recognizing medical, eugenic, psychiatric and socio-
economic justifications, and still more permissive codes in the 
Soviet Union, Eastern European nations and J apan,6° although, 
with the exception of Japan, moderate and permissive codes are 
a relatively recent historical trend, gaining acceptance in the 
former countries only after 1965 and in the communist countries 
after 1955. 
III. THE ATTACK UPON THE LAw 
Cast in the wider relief of comparative legal codes, the current 
attack upon the American abortion statute becomes more under-
standable. If freer abortion is a felt environmental need of the 
times, it has so far been much more urgently felt and legally 
accepted in other parts of the world. It is a commonplace to 
venture that the ingrained mores of Judeo-Christian religious 
beliefs and of the Anglo-American legal regard for life in any form 
have confined legal abortion only to the most necessary instances. 
This view carries a strain of moral self-congratulation. Perhaps 
further, in the American case, the persistent belief in the ca-
pacity of an equitable distribution of its natural resources to 
support an unbridled population has until recently concealed 
birth control generally and abortion particularly as an environ-
mental problem. 
As noted earlier, the movement for the reform of traditional 
legislation to incorporate broader grounds, or indications, for 
abortion has been in progress for at least a decade and has 
achieved significant legislative amendment in at least 14 states 
since 1967. Abortion statutes in imitation of the Model Code 
provisions, and the withdrawal of criminal sanctions in three 
states, have resulted thus farY Now, within the past 24 months, 
in a remarkable burst of decisional law, the courts, federal and 
state, have entertained a full-blown assault on the constitu-
tionality of even liberalized statutes. And of the 12 lower courts 
willing to grapple with the merits of the constitutional arguments, 
eight62 have struck down the applicable statute, and four63 sus-
tained it, on constitutional grounds. Dissents have been common 
and strenuous, so that at least two lines of argument and prece-
dent have already grown available as respectable reasoning for 
478 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
the decisions of courts soon to be confronted by such attacks 
upon abortion law. Most importantly, before many more lower 
federal or state courts meet the issue, the Supreme Court will 
have had the opportunity to pass on the merits of all the consti-
tutional arguments. It has already sustained the typical statute 
against the charge of unconstitutional ambiguity,64 and during 
the 1971 Term will have the opportunity to address the nature 
of a woman's "right" to abortion.65 
The legal contentions reflect in varying degree a battery of 
un articulated arguments embedded in constitutional language. 
At the outset it might be well to enumerate these in bare-faced, 
extralegal terms since they underlay much of the dialogue in the 
courts. 
First, the current law is assailable as largely unenforced and 
unenforceable. The law is rarely applied to a licensed physician 
and only slightly more often to the back street abortionist or 
quack. Successful illegal abortion is a collaborative effort. It 
produces no victim or complainant, and is typically concealed 
by all parties as a matter of course. Yet the legal prohibition 
inhibits the medical profession and drives the abortion-seeking 
woman from the reluctant qualified physician to the unskilled 
dangerous amateur. 
Second, the law can be said, even in reformed or therapeutic 
provisions, to be so inherently uncertain that it continues to 
have an in terrorem effect on the medical profession and to fail 
to apprise the doctor of the standard of criminality which he 
risks when he performs an abortion. 
Third, the law can be said to lag far behind medical realities 
as an obsolete creature intended to protect the woman from 
nineteenth century conditions making all surgery dangerous. 
Present techniques make abortion during the first trimester of 
pregnancy as much as seven times safer than ultimate child-
birth.66 
Fourth, the law, even the reform legislation, can be said to 
perpetuate an inevitably de facto discriminatory impact, leaving 
safe, justifiable abortion available to the affluent, the informed 
and the well connected, but denying it to the poor, the unin-
formed and the unconnected. 
And, fifth, the law can be said to reflect the general moral and 
religious attitudes of another era, and now at best the religious 
views of a distinct minority who will regulate their own conduct 
without legal sanction. 
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In defense of restrictive abortion law it can be argued that 
present statutes are entirely tolerable because they can be con-
strued realistically to free the medical profession from the chill 
of prosecution so long as reasonable medical judgment is em-
ployed in good faith; that the standard of criminality is clearly 
ascertainable to the physician; that the unenforcement or unen-
forceability of the law does not alter the wrongfulness of its 
violation; that the law's discriminatory impact is as inevitable 
as the naturally unequal distribution of wealth and no more so 
than the action of the state; that the unequal accessibility to safe 
abortion would remain even if restrictive law were repealed; and 
that the law reflects a traditional cultural reverence for life in 
any form still embodied in the preponderant public opinion. 
The legal merits offer two avenues of analysis. One course 
would be an examination of the common dominant legal con-
tentions, issue by issue, cutting across the array of recent de-
cisions. The alternative would be a consideration of the personal 
and societal interests involved in the abortion controversy: 
those of (1) the pregnant woman, (2) the embryo and "fetus, (3) 
the performing physician, (4) the father, and (5) the state or 
community. The latter approach subordinates the legal argu-
ments to the parties whom they are designed to serve. Under 
this arrangement of the issues, the interest of the pregnant woman 
is the first for dicsussion. 
IV. THE WOMAN 
The main assault of the campaign against existing abortion 
law is the contention that a woman possesses the fundamental 
constitutional right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy. As 
with other fundamental rights of the individual, the government 
may not infringe upon such a basic liberty unless it shows a 
compelling, overriding state interest. With some potentially 
significant shifts in emphasis, this right has been characterized 
as one of family or marital privacy or one of personal physical 
integrity and autonomy of the woman. Constitutional authority 
for its assertion derives from an evolutionary series of Supreme 
Court decisions culminating in the case of Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.67 The origin of the right has been located variously, in funda-
mental precepts predating the Constitution,68 in the text of the 
Bill of Rights itself,69 as a necessary incident or penumbra of 
specific enumerated rights,1° as a preeminent unenumerated right 
intended by the ninth amendment,71 and as a form of liberty 
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guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. 72 
A. Family Privacy or Autonomy 
The enunciation of a constitutional right of family privacy or 
family autonomy is traceable through a now familiar chain of 
regularly linked Supreme Court decisions. In the first of these, 
Meyer v. Nebraska,73 the Court struck down a state law forbidding 
the use of language other than English in classroom instruction 
in all elementary schools in the state, public, private and pa-
rochial. The statute contravened the due process clause of the 
fourteenth amendment as an arbitrary interference "with the 
power oj parents to control the education of their own."74 The 
"liberty" protected by the due process clause included the right 
"to marry, establish a home and bring up children."76 Several 
years later in Pierce v. Society of Sisters76 the Court reemphasized 
the overriding right of parents to control the education of their 
children in the face of an Oregon statute compelling universal 
public school attendance. Citing Meyer as controlling authority, 
it invalidated the statute as an unreasonable restriction of pa-
rental liberty to direct the upbringing and education of children 
and added that 
the child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture 
him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, 
to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.77 
The 1942 case of Skinner v. Oklahoma78 provided the Court 
occasion to suggest constitutional status for the individual's 
right to procreate. The Court voided an Oklahoma criminal law 
providing for the sterilization of statutorily defined "habitual 
criminals" as an arbitrary classification in violation of the equal 
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Court 
subjected such a classification to close scrutiny because of its 
curtailment of the basic liberties of marriage and procreation.79 
In 1967 the Court conferred express constitutional status on 
the right to marry freely. Loving v. Virginia 80 struck down the 
Virginia prohibition of interracial marriage as a violation of the 
due process clause. 
Still, the nature of such family-related rights has not been 
absolute. In the 1944 decision of Prince v. Massachusetts 81 the 
Court upheld the provision of a Massachusetts child labor law 
ABORTION AND THE LAW 481 
forbidding the sale of any kind of goods in a street or public 
place by a boy under the age of 12 or a girl under the age of 18, 
in its application to a nine-year-old Jehovah's Witness who was 
assisting her guardian with the distribution of religious literature. 
In this instance the majority held the state's interest in the 
health and development of children to outweigh both claims of 
religious freedom and of the right of parental control of children. 
While the Court remarked that the Meyer and Pierce decisions 
"respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter," the fact that the combined force of those two rights could 
not override the state's interest signified that parental or family 
rights were properly regulable. 
B. Personal Physical Integrity or Autonomy 
Aside from her peculiar right as a paren t, the pregnan t woman 
finds support for her claim in the traditionally recognized consti-
tutional right of personal physical liberty or autonomy implicit 
in the due process clause. The most frequently cited expression 
of this right arose from the 1891 decision of Union Pac. Ry. v. 
Botsford. 82 
No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded ... than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own 
person, free from all restraints or interference of others, unless by 
clear and unquestionable authority of law. As well said by Judge 
Cooley, "The right to one's person may be said to be a right of com-
plete immunity: to be let alone." 
The woman carrying an unwanted pregnancy now invokes this 
right to control her own body and in particular her reproductive 
faculties both before and after conception. 
Again, of course, the right of personal bodily freedom is not 
absolute. The Supreme Court has acknowledged overriding public 
health interests in the enforcement of compulsory vaccination 
laws 83 and of narrowly drawn eugenic sterilization statutes. 84 
C. The Griswold Rationale 
The 1965 Griswold decision with its splinter opinions offers the 
richest source of substantive law and constitutional methodology 
applicable to the adjudication of the pregnant woman's right to an 
abortion. The Court seems destined to address the analogies and 
distinctions drawn between the right to contraception and the 
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right to abortion. The proposed extension of the Griswold 
rationale forms the backbone of the abortion-seeking woman's 
argument; its proposed distinction by the government rests on 
respectable legal and medical grounds. 
The discussion of such a multifarious 85 and overanalyzed 
decision should begin with a recitation of the precise holding. 
Invalidating a statute punishing the assisting, abetting or 
counseling of the use of contraceptive devices, the Court held 
that such a restriction infringed upon a basic constitutional right 
of marital privacy. For the Court Mr. Justice Douglas gleaned 
this basic right, as a species of privacy suggested by the previous 
cases, from the periphery or penumbra of certain specific amend-
ments: the privacy of one's association under the first amend-
ment; the privacy assured by the third amendment's prohibition 
against the quartering of troops "in any house"; the fourth 
amendment's guarantee of the right against unreasonable 
searches and seizures; the "zone of privacy" created by the 
fifth amendment's self-incrimination clause; and, finally, the 
ninth amendment's assurance that "[t]he enumeration in the 
Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny 
or disparage others retained by the people."86 
The concluding paragraph of the opinion of the Court permits 
little doubt that the right of "privacy" synthesized from these 
textual sources is peculiarly marital. 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-
older than our political parties, older than our school system. Mar-
riage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, 
and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty , not commercial or social projects. Yet it is 
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions. 87 
In a separate concurring opinion joined by Chief Justice 
Warren and Justice Brennan, Justice Goldberg agreed that the 
right of marital privacy lay well within "the protected penumbra 
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights," but placed special 
stress on the ninth amendment as the coordinate repository of 
such unenumerated but nonetheless fundamental personal 
rights. 88 
In separate concurring opinions Justices Harlan and White 
also affirmed the constitutional right of marital privacy but pre-
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ferred to locate it in the direct application to the states of the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. To assure 
such rights, "[t]he Due Process Clause ... stands ... on its own 
bottom," said Justice Harlan. 89 
Finall y, two Justices, Black and Stewart, dissented from the 
recognition of a constitutional right of marital privacy imper-
ceptible to them in the text of the Constitution. 90 
The upshot of Griswold, then, is that seven Justices acknowl-
edged the existence of such a right and differed only over its 
textual source; five ascribed it to an amalgamation of the first, 
third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments; three of these empha-
sized the vi tali ty of the nin th amendmen t; and two others 
preferred the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
D. The Extension of Griswold to Abortion 
The extension of the Griswold holding from contraception to 
abortion has become the dispositive issue of the recent decisions. 
Similarities and distinctions are easily invoked. The central 
distinction, of course, is that Griswold recognizes a right to prevent 
conception, not a right to eliminate an existing conception or 
"life. " 
A subsidiary difference, not usually considered in the de-
cisions, lies in the necessary manner of enforcemen t of respective 
anti-contraception and anti-abortion statutes. In Griswold the 
Court observed with repugnance that the supposed enforcement 
of a law against the use of contraceptives required police to 
invade the marital bed chamber itself. 91 The enforcement of re-
strictive abortion law, however, requires no such necessary 
intrusion into the precincts of the home, but only the regulation 
of health facilities and personnel, public, private, or unlawful, in 
a more familiar exercise of a traditional police power. Instances 
of intrusive search can, of course, be imagined in the enforcement 
of abortion law. Abortions may be performed in the home or 
doctor's office, and the police may be drawn there. And advocates 
of relaxed abortion law anticipate the development of a con-
venien t oral a bortifacien t kept and consumed in the home. 92 
These expectations, however, do not disprove the applicability 
of tradi tional search-and-seizure doctrine to home abortion 
practices. 
The asserted similarities between contraception and abortion 
reduce to the proposition that Griswold bestows a fundamental 
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right of choice upon a woman, or upon a husband and wife, 
whether and when to have children. This constitutional right to 
control the size and spacing of one's family is claimed to en-
compass the right to abortion for the same end or the right to 
employ abortion as a cure for contraceptive failure. In an oft 
cited law review article, former Justice Clark, the silent member 
of the majority opinion in Griswold, encapsules the constitu-
tional argument for the extension of that decision to abortion: 
Moreover, abortion falls within that sensitive area of privacy-the 
marital relation. One of the basic values of this privacy is birth con-
trol, as evidenced by the Griswold decision. Griswold's act was to 
prevent formation of the fetus. This, the Court found, was constitu-
tionally protected. If an individual may prevent conception, why 
can he not nullify that conception when prevention has failed?93 
A number of lower federal and state courts have already ac-
cepted the invitation to expand Griswold to the limits of its logic, 
to enlarge the woman's, or family's, right to contraception to 
the general right to birth control. Several others have declined 
the invitation. 
In 1969 the Supreme Court of California became the first to 
acknowledge a constitutional right to abortion. In People v. 
Belous94 it flatly declared the existence of such a "right to 
privacy" or "liberty in matters related to marriage, family and 
sex" in light of Griswold and of the earlier decisions of the 
Supreme Court. The court regarded the critical issue to be not 
the existence of such a right but rather the existence of a "com-
pelling state interest in the regulation" of that right. 
That same year the Federal District Court for the District of 
Columbia followed Belous' lead, but with a more cautiously 
phrased formulation of the woman's right to abort. In United 
States v. Vuitch,95 the court acknowledged that "a woman's 
liberty and right of privacy extends to family, marriage and sex 
matters and may well include the right to remove an unwanted child 
at least in early stages of pregnancy."96 Certainly the right was 
not absolute. 
The asserted constitutional right of privacy, here the unqualified 
right to refuse to bear children, has limitations. Congress can un-
doubtedly regulate abortion practice in many ways, perhaps even 
establishing different standards at various phases of pregnancy, if 
informed legislative findings were made after a modern review of 
the medical, social and constitutional problems presented. 97 
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Vuitch, then, shows the first judicial sensitivity to the com-
plexity of a more fully defined constitutional right of abortion. 
Absent legislative assistance, difficult choices lurk in the courts' 
delineation of the boundaries of that right. For its part the Vuitch 
court was content to say only that "[m]atters here certainly 
reached a point where a sound, informed interest of the state must 
affirmatively appear before the state infringes unduly on such 
rights."98 
Similarly, in Babbitz v. McCann,99 a three-judge federal panel 
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin concurred in the recognition 
of a woman's "fundamental private right" to abortion but gave 
it a more qualified characterization as a right of "private de-
cision whether to bear her unquickened child."loO Relying on 
Griswold, that court designated the ninth amendment as the 
textual source of the woman's right, with ready support from the 
collective penumbrae of the specific amendments. Also note-
worthy is that the court at one point terms it "a woman's in-
herently personalright."lol 
A three-judge panel for the Northern District of Texas soon 
afterwards held the Texas abortion provisions unconstitutional 
because they deprived "single women and married couples of 
their right, secured by the Ninth Amendment, to choose whether 
to have children."lo2 Thus Roe v. Wade also locates the origin 
of the right in the ninth amendment. And that decision, involving 
a single pregnant plaintiff as well as a married couple, expressly 
adds a dimension to the woman's right as one possessed by single 
as well as married women. Previously every relevant decision 
had treated the right as a peculiarly marital one. 
Subsequently in Doe v. Bolton103 plaintiffs, in a class action, 
represented pregnant women, married and single, in their attack 
upon the Georgia therapeutic abortion statute before a three-
judge federal court. The Bolton court was equally amenable to a 
right of privacy generated from either the ninth amendment or 
the usual penumbral regions, but it declined an uncritical ex-
tension of the right of contraception to abortion. It formulated a 
far more conditional constitutional right to the latter. While 
"the concept of personal liberty embodies a right to privacy 
which apparently is also broad enough to include the decision to 
abort a pregnancy," once conception has occurred and the 
embryo formed, the decision to abort its development "cannot 
be considered a purely private [right] affecting only husband 
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and wife, man and woman."104 "A potential human life together 
with the traditional interests in the health, welfare and morals 
of its citizenry under the police power grant to the state a legiti-
mate area of control short of an invasion of the personal right of 
initial decision."105 But by police power here the court meant no 
more than the regulation of the medical procedure accompanying 
the decision and performance of abortion. 
Rather than regulating merely the quality of the decision to have 
an abortion, and the manner of its performance, the Georgia statute 
also limits the number of reasons for which an abortion may be 
sought. This the State may not do, because such action unduly 
restricts a decision sheltered by the Constitutional right to privacy.106 
Ultimately, then, the Bolton court settled on a qualified, regulable 
but nonetheless constitutional right to abortion. But it would 
not accede to a facile extension of Griswold from contraception to 
abortion. 
By comparison, the most recent federal court to recognize 
abortion as a constitutional right saw no distinction between 
that right and the right to use contraceptives sanctioned by the 
Griswold decision. The majority of the three-judge panel in 
Doe v. 8cott107 held that at least during the first trimester of 
pregnancy the fact of conception did not diminish a woman's 
interest in privacy and control over her body. 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Page, a lower Pennsylvania 
court, voiding that state's exceptionless prohibition of abor-
tion, has equated the right of abortion with that of contraception 
announced in Griswold. 
We believe the rationale of the case of Griswold u. Connecticut is 
applicable and may be extended to abortive action after conception 
and that the abortion statute interferes with the individual's private 
right to have or not to have children. Both the Connecticut and 
Pennsylvania statutes are at odds with current medical practice, 
both invade the intimate realm of marital privacy, both interfere 
with a married couple's freedom to control the number and spacing 
of offspring, and both are in conflict with a solu tion to one of the 
world's critical problems, the population explosion. lOS 
But Griswold has not encouraged all courts having the oppor-
tunity to recognize a woman's constitutional right of abortion, 
broadly or narrowly defined. Wary of the merits, several federal 
district courts have withheld prospective injunctive relief, avail-
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able on a showing of a substantial federal question and the threat 
of immediate irreparable harm, against state abortion statutes 
until the abortion has been performed and the prosecution of the 
performing physician set in motion.109 The doctor, then, would 
have to perform the abortion at his own risk. 
In the instance of Doe (and Hodgson) v. Randall,llo once the 
indictment was brought, the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of M~nnesota invoked the resurgent policy of federal 
abstention to permit "unimpaired" proceedings in the state 
courts. Back in the state system the lower Minnesota court 
addressed the merits of the physician's motion to dismiss an 
indictment against her for having performed a therapeutic 
abortion in a licensed hospital at the request of a patient and 
her husband, where the woman had been exposed to rubella 
(German measles) in the early stages of pregnancy. The Hodgson 
case presented the first known felony prosecution in the United 
States of a qualified licensed physician for performing a thera-
peutic abortion in a hospital, after extensive medical consultation 
and for reasons widely recognized as valid by the medical pro-
fession. The lower Minnesota court rej ected the motion of a con-
stitutional right to abortion and refused to dismiss the indict-
ment.lll The Supreme Court of Minnesota delivered a one-
sentence denial of the physician's application for a writ of pro-
hibition to the lower court,1l2 and the United States Supreme 
Court subsequently dismissed the appeal and denied certiorari.ll3 
Thus far at least three federal courts have expressly denied 
the existence of the woman's fundamental right to terminate her 
pregnancy. In Rosen v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Exami-
ners,ll4 the majority of the three-judge panel held firmly to a 
sharp distinction between the woman's right to prevent concep-
tion and her claimed right to eliminate conception. 
We do not find that an equation of the generalized right of the woman 
to determine whether she shall bear children with the asserted right 
to abort an embryo or fetus is compelled by fact or logic. Exercise of 
the right to an abortion on request is not essential to an effective 
exercise of the right not to bear a child, if a child for whatever reason 
is not wanted. Abstinence, rhythm, contraception and sterilization 
are alternative means to this end. ll5 
The court held that the Louisiana statute, penalizing any abor-
tion not done to save the mother's life, embodied a permissible 
state policy to subordinate the interests of a pregnant woman, 
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short of her interest to be free from a threat to her life, to the 
interest of fetal development toward a natural birth. Such a 
policy did not offend the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment or any other constitutional guarantee. 
A federal panel for the Western District of North Carolina 
showed similar respect for that state's therapeutic abortion 
statute. In Corkey v. Edwards1l6 the court held that, unlike con-
traception, abortion required a balance to be struck between the 
woman's right to privacy and the fetal right to life, and that such 
a "value judgment" was most properly a legislative determina-
tion. The court would not regard that determination, at least in 
the form of a therapeutic abortion statute, as an unreasonable 
one. 
A three-judge federal court for the Northern District of Ohio 
has flatly distinguished contraception from abortion and refused 
recognition of a fundamental right to the latter. On the contrary, 
in Steinberg v. Brown,1l7 the majority found that the conception 
of embryonic or fetal life brings that prenatal "life" within the 
protection of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth 
amendments. If novel rights are to be created, that court pre-
ferred to impute them to the fetal life in opposition to the 
woman. 
E. Additional Constitutional Contentions 
Several other constitutional arguments have been advanced in 
behalf of the pregnant woman since Griswold, but for the most 
part these have brought little attention or success in the recent 
decisions. Predictably, one has been that the typical abortion 
statute renders abortion scarcely available to classes of less 
affluent and knowledgeable women, and thereby deprives them 
of the equal protection of the law. Thus far the courts have found 
the equal protection clause unnecessary to their reasoning. 
Sympathetic courts in the Belous, Vuitch and Wade decisions did 
not discuss the issue; the Babbitz1l8 and Bolton1l9 courts rejected 
the contention, even though both held in favor of the woman's 
fundamental right to abortion; and the lower Pennsylvania 
court in the Page decision merely suggested its approval.120 On 
the other side of the results, the Rosen majority ignored the 
contentions while the dissenter approved of it;121 the Steinberg 
decision found no state action involved and gave the issue 
short shrift,122 while again the dissenter was persuaded.123 
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In a few instances the pregnant woman has argued that the 
legally compelled continuance of an unwanted pregnancy in-
flicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth 
and fourteenth amendments. This contention was summarily 
dismissed by the majority in Steinbert24 but accepted by the 
dissenter in Rosen.125 
F. Analysis 
Couched solely in bloodless constitutional terms, the pregnant 
woman's living interests tend to lose their immediacy. These 
actual "interests" are to be distinguished from her unsettled 
legal "rights" and perhaps should be recapitulated at this point. 
Her interest in mere physical "life" is already recognized by 
almost all jurisdictions, and her interest in "health" by a 
growing minority. Beyond these, she presses for recognition of 
an interest in mental or psychological health in their broadest 
medically defined terms, and for a quality of family life and en-
vironment achievable through the limitation of family size. These 
interests have been condensed under the rubric "socioeconomic 
indications." Perhaps the British Actl26 best captures the totality 
of the pregnant woman's interests in its consideration of (1) her 
physical and mental health, (2) that of any other children of 
. her family, (3) that of the potential child, and (4) the woman's 
"actual or foreseeable environment." For such determinations 
the Act shows enormous deference to medical judgment. If the 
enumerated grounds or indications appear imprecise, they also 
permit latitude for the exercise of competent professional dis-
cretion incapable of codification. These indications must still 
be medically certifiable under established procedures. 
As a matter of constitutional law, pre-Griswold decisions spoke 
of a right of family privacy or autonomy as a protectible liberty 
within the due process clause. Griswold more specifically ac-
knowledged a constitutional right of "marital privacy" encom-
passing the use of contraception. And currently the lower courts 
are splitting sharply in their willingness to extend that constitu-
tional right to abortion. As this last question approaches decision 
by the Supreme Court, the recognition of a constitutional right 
of abortion begins to resemble only the beginning of sophistica-
tion. The deeper difficulty remains in the more detailed definition 
of such a right, a process which may require some time and 
several decisions so long as the Court chooses, as in the recent 
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Vuitch decision, to say only so much as is necessary to decide 
the particular case before it. 
Several of the more obvious definitional problems emerge from 
the cases. No court has characterized the right as absolute. Yet 
clear qualifications have not been dared probably for several 
reasons. First, they are usually not necessary for decision. And, 
second, they threaten to involve medical and biological determi-
nations about which the courts feel a wary inexpertise. The two 
dimensions of a constitutional right of abortion presently most 
conspicuous for their absence are (1) the character of that right 
as a peculiarly marital or intrinsically personal one, and (2) the 
duration of that right into pregnancy. 
The first issue is whether the right to abort belongs only to a 
married woman, or to a married woman and her husband, or to 
all women, married and single, as an incident to the freedom of 
their person. Only two courts favoring the right have had single 
pregnant women before them and both have attributed that 
right to them in support of the latter view.127 The characterization 
of the right as one of inherently personal physical liberty obviates 
problems of equal protection for married and single women. 
Arguably rational distinctions could be made between the two 
classes. As a matter of policy the state might be more concerned 
with the welfare of the married woman's going family unit; or 
it may be less sympathetic to the single woman's unwanted 
pregnancy and leave it unrelieved as an avowed deterrent of 
promiscuity. But such distinctions create more problems than 
they solve. Typically they are applied to justify classifications 
of legislative treatment, not the selective distribution of sup-
posedly fundamental constitutional rights. Classification of the 
constitutional right to abortion would invite immediate equal 
protection challenge. And, of course, the living interests under-
lying the right are often the same for married and single women: 
life; health, physical and mental; the interception of the product 
of felonious intercourse; and, in the case of the habitually illegiti-
mate mother, the environment and general welfare of her 
fa therless family. 
The characterization of abortion as a personal, nonmarital 
right could carry additional significance. Such a right belongs to 
the mother alone and consequently she may exercise it alone, 
without the consent of her husband. However, so long as the 
right continues to be identified in the "marital privacy" language 
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of Griswold, it remains uncertain whether the right attaches to 
the woman only in her marital status, or to the man and wife 
jointly. In the latter case its exercise might require some consent 
by the father for its exercise. In most cases, where the husband 
and wife agree in the abortion decision, the distinction is aca-
demic. But in an appreciable minority of cases involving the 
prospect or fact of dissolution of the marriage, antagonism and 
disagreement may complicate the abortion decision. If the right 
is a jointly held marital one, the husband may seek to controvert 
the wife's decision and attempt to enjoin the abortion. If the 
right is personal to the wife, her decision will be legally incontro-
vertible by the husband. 
The most unmanageable component of the woman's right is its 
uncertain duration. While the courts are competent to define 
the personal or marital nature of the woman's right, they may 
justifiably feel much less competent to prescribe a dimension of 
timeliness for that right. The point of time during a pregnancy, 
if any, at which the right to abort should diminish to a value 
less than that of competing interests, such as the woman's own 
health or the fetal right to continued life, involves difficult 
questions of medical judgment. The sense of the decisions is 
that the mother's right to abort declines, and that the fetal right 
to life grows, with the progress of the pregnancy. During the 
early stages, or the first trimester of pregnancy, abortion is a 
medically simple and safe operation. Beyond this stage it becomes 
increasingly dangerous to her life and health, and increasingly 
disputable as a medical decision. At the point of viability (seven 
months) the danger to the mother and the advanced life of the 
fetus weigh heavily against the right to an abortion not necessary 
to the woman's life or health. At the same time the fetus is 
becoming an increasingly "human" being amassing human 
physical and legal characteristics recognizable to even the most 
vigorous proponents of the primacy of the woman's right. Its 
destruction at a late stage strikes even these partisans as a re-
grettable, if not repugnant, act in the absence of grave needs of 
the woman.128 
For the Supreme Court the time dimension poses a delicate 
problem of degree best delegated to medical judgment. Certain 
discreet stages of pregnancy are available for guidance: concep-
tion, embryo (second through ninth week), fetal development to 
quickening (occurring about the sixteenth to twentieth week), 
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and viability (occurring about the seventh month). The Court 
will not be eager to translate close medical determinations into 
constitutional rights, even concededly qualified and regulable 
constitutional rights. During oral argument of the Vuitch case 
before the Court, counsel urged a fundamental right of at least 
the first three months duration. 129 Possi bl y the Court would 
eventually sanction this much absolutely and delegate further 
qualification to medical judgment. 
It has been suggested frequently enough that the problems of 
definition would disappear altogether if the Court would merely 
declare the existence of the right to abortion and withdraw legal 
regulations, or at least criminal sanctions, in favor of a private 
resolution between the woman and her doctor. ISO But the total 
withdrawal of legal regulation is an abdication disguised as a 
solution. It would leave intact the illegal abortion industry. It 
would leave a supposed fundamental right to a medical service 
declared but unimplemented in the absence of public facilities 
and prescribed medical procedures compelled by law. It would 
be legally assailable as an abandonment of an avowedly funda-
mental right to the purely private and unappealable discretion 
of the medical profession. And, as a matter of law, the mere 
recognition of a constitutional right scarcely precludes its reason-
able regulation in behalf of competing public and private 
interests. 
In the end the formidable task of definition is not at all the 
courts' alone. Former Justice Clark suggests the simple judicial 
recognition of the constitutional right to abortion with further 
delineation of that right left to the legislature. The process would 
be one of declaration by the Court and consequent reasonable 
regulation by the legislature. 
It is for the legislature to determine the proper balance, i.e., that 
point between prevention of conception and viability of the fetus 
which would give the State the compelling subordinating interest 
so that it may regulate or prohibit abortion without violating the 
individual's constitutionally protected rights. l31 
The private and social interests in potential conflict with the 
right of abortion confirm the wisdom of a cautious judicial state-
ment of that right. For example, if the Court defines the woman's 
fundamental right broadly as one of choice oj family size, that 
right of choice extends to both the decision to have and not to 
have children. If the state cannot force a woman to continue an 
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unwanted pregnancy, neither can it compel her to discontinue a 
wanted pregnancy. The right of choice, then, arises in potential 
opposition to projected population control policies of compulsory 
abortion, contraception, or sterilization. And in light of its consti-
tutionally fundamental personal nature, the state will bear the 
burden of proving a compelling, overriding interest for its 
abridgement. 
Additional social interests militate for the continued legal 
regulation, restrictive and expeditious, of abortion. First, how-
ever, the array of involved private interests remains to be can-
vassed. Of these the most supposedly adverse and surely im-
ponderable interest is that of the embryo or fetus. 
V. THE UNBORN BEING 
A. Characterization 
A systematic examination of the interests and rights of the 
unborn embryonic or fetal being immediately confronts the 
problem of characterization. For those who believe that biological 
and legal "life" arise in their full "human" sense at conception, 
the issue is settled.132 For those who regard conception as the 
creation of life of less-than-human status, the controversy has 
merely begun. For doctors the preferred definition of the con-
ceptus is frequently based on biological observation. 
My feeling is that the fetus, particularly during its early intra-
uterine life, is simply a group of specialized cells that do not differ 
materially from other cells. 
And I feel that if it is going to be for the welfare of the adult indi-
vidual, and for society in certain instances, we are just:ified in 
eliminating those cells. 
If one can justify shooting a burglar who enters your room or going 
to war and shooting an enemy, one can certainly justify the elimi-
nation of some cells which, from my point of view, have not yet 
become a human being, but simply have the potentialities of life.133 
Another physician preeminent in the campaign for relaxation of 
the law offers the following views as professionally repre-
sentative. 
Physicians as a whole do not believe that a human being begins at 
conception. I know of no non-Catholic scientist who does. I know 
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of no scientist at all, no scientist in any field of biological science, 
who whould say that an acorn, the second that that acorn has been 
fertilized, is an oak. It is a potential oak; it is not an oak. And a 
fertilized ovum is not a human being.134 
The lawyer is inclined to rest his preferred characterization 
on a simpler behavioral definition of human activity. 
To say that life is present at conception is to give recognition to the 
potential, rather than the actual. The unfertilized egg has life, and 
if fertilized, it takes on human proportions. But the law deals in 
reality, not obscurity-the known rather than the unknown. When 
sperm meets egg life may eventually form, but quite often it does 
not. The law does not deal in speculation. The phenomenon of life 
takes time to develop, and until it is actually present, it cannot be 
destroyed. Its interruption prior to formation would hardly be homi-
cide, and as we have seen, society does not regard it as such. The 
rites of Baptism are not performed and death certificates are not 
required when a miscarriage occurs. No prosecutor has ever returned 
a murder indictment charging the taking of the life of a fetus. This 
would not be the case if the fetus constituted human life. [Footnotes 
omi tted. p35 
Post-Griswold courts have typically avoided resort to biological 
definitions of the fetus, and have skirted precise characterization 
as unnecessary to their conclusions. Biological data are given 
passing mention and then left as indeterminative of the right to 
abortion. The decisions have acknowledged an interest of the 
embryo or fetus in development toward birth and life, but they 
have circumvented a direct characterization of the fetal value 
taken alone. Instead they have considered it mainly in conjunc-
tion with the woman's right to abort and held that, whatever 
its character, the early fetal interest must usually yield to the 
mother's. The approach of the Babbitz court exemplifies this aver-
sion for simple characterization. 
[T]he mother's interests are superior to that of an unquickened 
embryo, whether the embryo is mere protoplasm, as the plaintiff con-
tends, or a human being, as the Wisconsin statute declares. [Emphasis 
added.p3G 
The contrasting minority view of recent discussions charac-
terizes fetal life as unqualified human life. 
[T]hose decisions which strike down state abortion statutes by equat-
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ing contraception and abortion pay no attention to the facts of 
biology . 
. . . Biologically, when the spermatozoon penetrates and fertilizes 
the ovum the result is the creation of a new organism which conforms 
to the defini tion of life .... 
. . . Once human life has commenced, the constitutional protection 
found in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments impose upon the 
state the duty of safe-guarding it.137 
B. Common Law Analogies 
Advocates of the absolute or relative priority of fetal rights 
in the absence of the reasonable certainty of maternal death 
have drawn heavily on the respect accorded prenatal life by 
other branches of the law. They have argued that the common 
law long conferred upon the fetus substantial standing in prop-
erty, tort, criminal law and equity, all in recognition of pre-
natal life as full human life. 
The common law of real property first bestowed rights on the 
embryo or fetus. As early as 1795 English courts held the word 
"children" in a will to include a life in the womb.138 Several 
years later another English court, holding an unborn child to 
be a life in being under the rule against perpetuities, enumerated 
the legal attributes of the fetal being. 
He may be vouched in a recovery, though it is for the purpose of 
making him answer over in value. He may be an executor. He may 
take under the Statute of Distributions .... He may take by devise. 
He may be entitled under a charge for raising portions. He may have 
an injunction; and he may have a guardian. la9 
American courts followed the common law rules of the unborn's 
property rights. In the leading case in 1834, Massachusetts held 
the term "living" to encompass any life merely conceived. l40 It 
needed only to be in esse; it did not need even to have quickened. 
The general American view continued to treat the fetus en ventre 
sa mere as a living child for the benefit of its property interests. l4l 
Fiction or not, the rule did work to preserve the property 
interests of a subsequently born child otherwise lost by his 
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tardy birth. It served the equitable distribution of property 
among children. As a practical matter, of course, the realization 
of such prenatal property rights turned on a successful birth. 
Early tort law barred recovery to the child suffering tortious 
prenatal injury because of the difficulty of proving causation, 
the fear of fraudulent claims, and the authoritative view of 
Justice Holmes that "the unborn child was a part of the mother 
at the time of the injury .... "142 The last twenty-five years, 
however, have brought a striking reversal of the old rule. Now 
a prenatally injured child born alive is permitted an action for 
the consequences of that injury.143 Should it subsequently die as 
a result of the injury, a wrongful death action will lie in its be-
half.144 Several qualifications remain in some jurisdictions. One 
is the requirement that the fetus be viable at the time of injury.145 
And, significantly, the other is that the fetus be born alive.146 
The criminal in his treatment of the fetus shows less concern 
for full human life. At common law it was not possible for the 
unborn child to be the object of the crime of murder,147 and no 
crime at all arose from abortion before quickening. Abortion after 
quickening was punished as a misdemeanor.148 Nineteenth cen-
tury legislation eliminated the requirement of quickening and 
punished abortion as a felony. To the present, however, it has 
remained an offense less than, and independent from, murder 
or manslaughter. 
In equity, the appointment of a guardian to protect the 
property or person of the unborn child has been cited as a regard 
for incapacitated human life before birth.149 The most compelling 
such case involved the appointment of a special guardian to 
facilitate a decree for a blood transfusion necessary to save the 
unborn life despite the religious objection of the mother.150 
Such common law treatment does demonstrate a respect for 
unborn life, but it is not conclusive of the legally full human 
character of that life. It remains arguable that these adaptations 
of property and tort law and of equitable remedies have been 
designed out of fairness to permit a retroactive vindication of the 
interests of the ultimately born full human life. In property only 
the successfully born or his successors in interest will prosecute 
those interests. In tort the live-birth requirement in many juris-
dictions still reflects this purpose. In equity the guardian protects 
fetal interests in anticipation of its birth. In criminal law abor-
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tion as a crime was postponed to quickening as a misdemeanor 
and still has not been equated with homicide. The common law 
analogies invoked by proponents of restrictive abortion law seem 
only to reflect an instinctual ambivalence about fetal life, a re-
spect for that life's possibilities but a reluctance to regard it as 
full human life, especially in its nonviable stages. These analogies 
are hardly dispositive of the abortion controversy where fetal 
life confronts increasingly valued competing rights and interests, 
especially those of the pregnant woman. 
C. Post-Griswold Treatment 
Weighing the early unborn interest to fetal development 
against the woman's claim to abortion, the recent decisions have 
predominantly favored the latter. However, in several cases, the 
fetal right has prevailed. The court in Steinberg v. Brown flatly 
held the fetal right to "life" under the due process clause to be 
superior to any right of the mother short of her own right to 
life.l5l In Rosen v. Louisiana State Board oj Medical Examiners ,152 
and Corkey v. Edwards,153 the courts upheld the same legislative 
policy. The lower Minnesota court in Minnesota v. Hodgson 
relied on common law analogy to treat prenatal life as full human 
life overriding all other non-vital interests of the mother.154 
The decisions favoring the woman's right have necessarily 
assigned inferior value to fetal development. In People v. Belous 
the California Supreme Court construed the purpose of its 1850 
abortion statute to have been the protection of the pregnant 
woman from unskilled criminal abortion. Since that purpose had 
lapsed with the development of safe abortion techniques and 
since the restrictive law was now believed to promote illegal 
abortion, no compelling state interest was found to justify a 
limitation upon the woman's fundamental right to abortion.155 
The court expressly rejected the equivalence of fetal life with that 
of a born child.156 The district court's V uitch decision did not 
discuss fetal rights except for its suggested limitation of the 
right to abort to early stages of pregnancy.157 The Babbitz court 
held the unquickened fetal life overbalanced by the woman's 
right to abort.158 The Bolton court viewed the embryo as a "life 
form with the potential of independent human existence."169 The 
Wade court allowed that concern over the quickened fetus might 
be a legitimate state interest but not compelling enough to justify 
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the overbroad Texas necessary-for-life provision.160 The most 
recent federal decision favoring the right of the woman held the 
unborn's interest subordinate at least through the first trimester 
of pregnancy.l61 And in Commonwealth v. Page162 the lower Penn-
sylvania court concluded that early fetal life did not constitute a 
"person" within the sense of the due process clause. 
If the fetal interest has been more often overridden by the 
woman's it has not been held an absolutely inferior value. The 
courts have held usually against the claim of early fetal life. 
Typically they have found offensive unconstitutionally overbroad 
statutory prohibitions of all abortion as a personal right. How-
ever obliquely, almost all decisions have preserved the opportu-
nity for a legislative accommodation of maternal and advanced 
fetal interests under regulatory statutes more narrowly drawn 
and respectful of the right of the woman to terminate an early 
pregnancy.163 
VI. THE DOCTOR 
Medical students have often asked how it is possible that reputable 
physicians will perform illegal abortions. The reply the au thor gives 
is that society will condone such practices for its own convenience 
providing that it does not have to collectively assume the moral 
responsibility for openly justifying them.164 
A. The Affirmative Sense oj Health 
Those physicians most intent upon the liberalization, if not the 
abolition, of the law of abortion propose the implementation of 
"health" in the broadest, most contemporary sense of that term. 
Health in the broad sense ... is a positive concept. Distinctions 
between physical and mental health are meaningless in terms of 
modern medical thinking. Health cannot be divorced from socio-
economic factors which influence people's lives since health is a 
product of these conditions. In applying criteria for abortion based 
on maternal health, the question should be the extent to which the 
pregnancy threatens the general well-being of the patient. The 
threat must justify the sacrifice of the child. As with the threat of 
death, the risk will be relative and should not be subject to specific 
legislation for all patients.165 
For such physicians the attack upon the current state of the 
law, and even the liberalized Model Code provisions, is unremit-
ting. 
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The laws which have been passed or proposed would bring medical 
practice up to about the year 1936. The laws presently in existence 
in most states ... make third-rate medicine possible and nothing 
better because they go back a hundred years or so. The A.L.1. Model 
Laws bring us to about 1936, and make it possible for the physician 
to practice second-rate medicine today. Thus I feel that the only 
adequate law would be a law which, without any reservations what-
soever, merely withdraws all abortion statutes out of the criminal 
code and places them with the Medical Practice Act so that abor-
tion becomes purely and simply a matter between woman and 
physician.166 
Not the least requirement of such expansive medical practice 
would be the duty to safeguard one's patient from the incom-
petent criminal abortionist.167 
The fact that criminal abortion law has fallen into desuetude 
in many jurisdictions does not relieve the professional frustration 
of the doctor. The law need not be rigorously enforced to exert an 
in terrorem impact on the profession. If he actively circumvents 
the law by falsification oflegal indications, he deeply resents the 
necessity of such hypocrisy. Ethical problems will emerge in 
compliance with procedures requiring the certification of fellow 
physicians and of hospital boards holding variant views of the 
law. The elements of hypocrisy and risk inhibit legal circumven-
tion and comprise a seemingly unwarranted interference with the 
physician's best medical judgment. The cumulative resentment 
of individual physicians has spurred them to confront the law 
directly. 
B. The Physician as Defendant 
The irony of his professional dilemma is that a doctor attacking 
restrictive abortion laws for the most positive professional rea-
sons must necessarily do so from the risky posture of a criminal 
defend an t. The doctor as criminal defendant is nonetheless the 
primary lawmaker in the current decisional movement. In his 
own professional interest he has provoked considerable substan-
tive lawmaking, first in the recognition of his patient's right to 
abortion and second in the novel application of several familiar 
constitutional doctrines to the typical abortion statute. 
Under the statutes the performing doctor and not the abor-
tion-seeking mother is the offender. In this position he has be-
come the beneficiary of her increasingly recognized right to 
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abortion. If he needed it, the Griswold decision conferred standing 
upon the physician, through his professional relationship with the 
woman, to challenge the constitutionality of the crime charged 
against him.I6s For this purpose the defendant physician has 
brought into play the doctrines of unconstitutional vagueness 
and overbreadth to attack the typical statute limiting abortion 
to preserva tion-of-life or preserva tion-of-life-or -heal th ins tances. 
The courts have been receptive to both arguments. However, a 
closer scrutiny of the decisions suggests that the courts have 
ignored traditional canons of statutory construction in order to 
invalidate, rather than preserve even in a more tolerable form, 
the existing law. In short, a closer analysis of the decisions hold-
ing abortion statutes void for vagueness or for unconstitutional 
overbreadth will disclose their serviceability to the medical 
profession during the past two years. 
In this light the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. 
Vuitch restored the doctrine of vagueness to its proper use. The 
Court expressly divorced the issue of vagueness from the ques-
tion of the woman's constitutional right to abort, and post-
poned the latter to another day. 
Appellee has suggested that there are other reasons why the dismissal 
of the indictments should be affirmed. Essentially, these arguments 
are based on this Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecticut [citation 
omitted]. Although there was some reference to these arguments in 
the opinion of the court below, we read it as holding simply that the 
statute was void for vagueness because it failed in that court's lan-
guage to "give that certainty which due process oflaw considers essen-
tial in a criminal statute" [citation omitted]. Since the question of 
vagueness was the only issue passed upon by the District Court it 
is the only issue we reach here.169 
And as a question of vagueness the typical abortion statute could 
not be held unconstitutional. 
But if the result of this decision belongs to the government, 
its reasoning bestows a clear victory on the practical cause of the 
doctor. For in upholding the typical statute the Court gave 
expansive interpretation to the term "health" and reposed an 
almost insuperable burden of proof on the government. "Health" 
includes "psychological as well as physical well being,"170 both 
physical and mental health reasons, "whether or not the patient 
[has] had a previous history of mental defects."l71 With regard to 
burden of proof the Court was "unable to believe that Congress 
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intended that a physician be required to prove his innocence," 
and therefore held that [under the District of Columbia Statute] 
"the burden is on the prosecution to plead and prove that an 
abortion was not "necessary for the preservation of the mother's 
life or health. "172 
The practical import of the V uitch decision was underscored 
by Justice Stewart, dissenting from the majority's statutory 
construction and at the same time extending that interpretation 
to "its logical conclusion."173 
As the Court says, "whether a particular operation is necessary for 
a patient's physical or mental health is a judgment that physicians 
are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever surgery is 
considered." 
It follows, I think, that when a physician has exercised his judg-
ment in favor of performing an abortion, he has, by hypothesis, not 
violated the statute. To put it another way, I think the question of 
whether the performance of an abortion is "necessary for the 
mother's life or health" is entrusted under the statute exclusively to 
those licensed to practice medicine, without the overhanging risk of 
incurring criminal liability at the hands of a second-guessing lay 
jury. I would hold, therefore, that "a competent licensed practitioner 
of medicine" is wholly immune from being charged with the commis-
sion of a criminal offense under this law.174 
C. The Uses oj Vagueness 
The Supreme Court has long found the doctrine of unconstitu-
tional indefiniteness in criminal statutes to be a malleable shield 
for the protection of preferred personal liberties. One need not 
impugn the purpose of the doctrine or the motives of the courts 
to describe its uses. After an exhaustive survey of its application 
by the Supreme Court, one eminent commentator concluded that 
it has been used "almost invariably for the creation of an in-
sulating buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of 
several of the Bill of Rights freedoms."175 The right of abortion 
presently resides in just such peripheral "freedoms," and not 
accidentally have receptive courts reached for the void-for-
vagueness doctrine in its protection. 
The doctrine has received eloquent statement over the years 
so that now the Supreme Court has available a supply of boiler-
plate passages of definition. The one most frequently employed 
in the abortion decisions declares that "a statute which either 
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forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and 
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due 
process .... "176 Thus "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, 
liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal 
statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the State 
commands or forbids."177 Coming closer to the case of the doctor 
attempting to determine whether an abortion is "necessary to 
preserve the life or health of his patient," the Court has said 
that "it will not do to hold an average man to the peril of an 
indictment for the unwise exercise of his ... knowledge involv-
ing so many factors of varying effect that neither the person to 
decide in advance nor the jury to try him after the fact can 
safely and certainly judge the result."178 Analogously the doctor 
argues that the physician should not be held to the peril of an 
indictment for judgment involving as many variable factors 
as comprise "life" or "health," and should not have that judg-
ment second-guessed by a prosecutor or a jury. 
Vagueness, of course, is a matter of degree. And in seemingly 
unconscious parallelism the Supreme Court has accumulated 
authority conceding certain inevitable quanta of statutory in-
definiteness. It has never gainsaid Holmes' observation of the 
irreducible ambiguity of language and of the inevitably objective 
standard of criminal liability to which a man is held. 
[T]he law is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his esti-
mating rightly, that is, as the jury subsequently estimates it, some 
matter of degree. If his judgment is wrong, not only may he incur a 
fine or a short imprisonment ... ; he may incur the penalty of 
death.179 
Still, the defendant should be aware that his conduct does require 
some judgment, correct or incorrect. 
Whenever the law draws a line there will be cases very near each 
other on opposite sides. The precise course of the line may be un-
certain, but no one can come near it without knowing that he does 
so, if he thinks, and if he does so it is familiar to the criminal law to 
make him take the risk.ISO 
Reconciling statements of unconstitutional ambiguity, on the one 
hand, and unavoidable ambiguity on the other, Justice Frank-
furter suggested that a criminal statute need not draw the precise 
line of illegality so long as it warns "one bent on obedience that 
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he comes near the prescribed area."181 A criminal statute could 
remain constitutionally sound, then, so long as it achieved 
proximi ty and not precision in its announcement of forbidden 
behavior. 
Before the Supreme Court's Vuitch decision the dominant 
judgment of the lower courts was that the preservation-of-life-or-
health standard did not apprise the physician of even his prox-
imity to criminal conduct. The accompanying body of dissent and 
several decisions took sharp issue. A brief review of the decisions 
supports the view that the void-for-vagueness doctrine was not 
serving the purpose of adequate warning for the defendant so 
much as it was promoting the preferred right of the woman to her 
abortion. 
The decisions put the concept of vagueness to three specific 
uses. First, they applied the original, direct due process rule that 
ambiguity deprives the defendant doctor of the fair warning of 
conduct for which he may be punished. Second, they indicated 
that an uncertain criminality inhibits the doctor from providing 
the assistance necessary to the exercise of the woman's funda-
mental right to an early abortion. The evil of this second form 
of vagueness was its curtailment of the right of the woman, not 
the rights of the doctor. The third function of ambiguity, said 
several courts, was that the enumeration of uncertain justifica-
tions for abortion directly abridged the woman's right. In short, 
the latter two senses of ambiguity served the interests of the 
woman and not the doctor. If he benefited from her assertion of a 
fundamental right to abortion, so did she from his assertion of 
statutory vagueness. 
Of these three rationales, the first is the traditional application 
of the fair-warning doctrine, the second a reasonable corollary, 
and the third a judicial confusion of the rules of vagueness and 
overbreadth. The first and second uses are closely related in fact. 
Physicians forced to guess at the lawfulness of their conduct will 
reach widely different conclusions in similar or identical cases. 
The results of such ambiguity are a drastic variation in abortion 
practices from doctor to doctor, hospital to hospital, and even 
ward to ward within a hospital, all to the aggravation of uneven, 
or de facto discriminatory, treatment of abortion-seeking women. 
Abortion practices vary not only from hospital to hospital but also 
from service to service within the same hospital. They also vary 
widely from doctor to doctor on the same service of the same hospi-
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tal. In one of the largest teaching hospitals in the East, for example, 
the ratio of its staff members ranges from 1: 140 to 1: 11. The victim 
of all this confusion is, of course, the American female. Even if she 
has a legitimate reason for therapeutic abortion, she must find 
Doctor X in hospital Y with policy Z to have it done.182 
The cases have offered various examples of the physician's 
dilemma. In Belous, under the pre-1967 California necessary-to-
preserve-the-mother's-life provision, the defendant doctor dealt 
with a patient threatening to visit the underground abortionist. 
He feared the possibility of "butchery in Tiajuana" and "self-
mutilation." The California Supreme Court found the phrase 
"necessary to preserve" inherently uncertain and rejected saving 
constructions permitting abortion wherever it might be safer than 
childbirth/83 as it would be in the usual early pregnancy. The 
Belous majority pursued the consequences of ambiguity one step 
further in its conclusion that statutory delegation of the abortion 
decision to a doctor who was necessarily inhibited by uncertain 
criminality amounted to an unconstitutional delegation of the 
abortion decision to a party interested in its nonperformance and 
thus the non-exercise of the woman's right.184 
The Vuitch court dealt with a provision permitting abortion 
"necessary for the preservation of the mother's life or health" 
and showed equal concern for the "particularly unconscionable" 
burden upon the doctor to construe "health" at his periJ.181i In 
addition, it found the provision to be a direct, overbroad restric-
tion of the woman's right.18G Similarly Roe v. Wade struck down 
the Texas save-the-life provision on the dual grounds that it 
denied the physician fair notice of criminal liability and un-
necessarily abridged the woman's right to abortion.187 And, in-
validating the Illinois statute, the court in Doe v. Scott observed 
that physicians should not be held to an understanding of lan-
guage on the meaning of which the courts have not been able to 
agree.188 In Commonwealth v. Page, the lower Pennsylvania court 
invalidated the exceptionless prohibition of "unlawfully ad-
ministered" abortion as a denial of fair warning to the physician 
and of fundamental rights to the woman.189 
By contrast several favorable decisions have refused to in-
validate restrictive statutes as void for vagueness. Babbitz v. 
McCann, a decision emphatic in its assertion of the woman's 
right, found the Wisconsin save-the-life provision constitutionally 
clear,19O but unconstitutionally overbroad in its direct restriction 
of a woman's right to early abortion. Similarly Doe v. Bolton 
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struck down Georgia's Model Code therapeutic abortion statute 
as unconstitutionally overbroad in its limitation of the grounds 
for abortion. The court did not find it necessary to address the 
charge of vagueness. Predictably, decisions upholding restrictive 
abortion statutes have summarily rejected the claim of uncon-
stitutional vagueness. l9l 
The void-for-vagueness rationale is vulnerable to criticism on 
several fronts. 192 First, canons of construction require the courts 
to preserve the validity of a statute wherever a reasonable inter-
pretation will do SO.193 In the instance of criminal provisions the 
courts can achieve this end through preferred narrowing con-
struction of disputed language. For the usual abortion provision 
this technique would produce an expansive definition of the terms 
"1· r ""h 1 h " d " ""H 1 h" ld· 1 d 11 h lIe, ea t ,an necessary. ea t cou mc u eat e 
medically recognized indications for therapeutic abortion. "Life" 
could allow for the physician's concern for a patient threatening 
suicide or recourse to the underground abortion market. Burdens 
of proof and rules of intent also could support the statute. 
Dissenters from the Belous decision pointed out that any statu-
tory vagueness there was cured by the requirement that the 
prosecution prove a specific intent to perform a criminal abor-
tion.194 In Corkey v. Edwards the court stressed its construction 
that the North Carolina therapeutic abortion statute left the 
burden of proof, including proof of intent, on the state to show an 
abortion outside the stated exemptions.195 Similarly the Mas-
sachusetts law permits the physician a defense of good faith 
accompanied by reasonable medical judgment for the preserva-
tion of life or health.196 The burden of proving bad intent remains 
with the prosecution. In short, the typical statute limiting abor-
tion to the necessity to preserve the woman's life, or health, can 
be artfully construed to provide adequate safeguard to a physi-
cian's right to fair warning. The policy of some of the lower 
courts not to indulge such a construction and instead to in-
validate the statute for indefiniteness tended to confuse the 
doctrine of vagueness and the defendant's right to notice, on the 
one hand, with the doctrine of overbreadth and the woman's 
right to abortion, on the other. 
D. The Propriety of Overbreadth 
Unconstitutional overbreadth invalidates a criminal statute 
which, either on its face or as authoritatively construed, not only 
reaches conduct lawfully punishable but also sweeps so broadly 
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as to punish constitutionally protected behavior.197 Overbreadth 
and vagueness will frequently arise from the same statutory 
language. Ambiguity generates both constitutional defects: it 
prevents adequate warning of proscribed conduct; and, without a 
narrowing construction, it permits the inclusion of protected with 
prohibited conduct. Elements of both infirmities have occasioned 
the Supreme Court's warning that "it would certainly be danger-
ous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all 
possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and 
say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at 
large."198 
In the recent decisions several courts have tended to mingle 
vagueness with overbreadth. In the Belous decision the California 
Supreme Court demonstrated the tendency to straddle both doc-
trines. 
We have concluded that the term "necessary to preserve" ... is 
not susceptible of a construction ... sufficiently certain to satisfy 
due process requirements without improperly infringing on funda-
mental constitutional rights.199 
Nevertheless the doctrines are distinct, despite their frequent 
coincidence. Statutory language may be unambiguous and none-
theless overbroad for its clear inclusion of protected activity with 
forbidden activity. Both doctrines are reasonably applicable to 
the usual preservation-of-life-or-health restriction. Of the two, 
however, overbreadth is a far less arbitrary rationale and one 
more consistent with the premise of a fundamental right to 
abortion. Vagueness will inevitably be a determination of degree 
on which courts, and judges within the same court, will differ. 
And, as already discussed, vagueness lends itself to two applica-
tions. First, apart from the recognition of any constitutional 
claim to abortion, vagueness had, prior to the V uitch decision, 
been held to deny the defendant doctor fair notice of criminal 
conduct.200 Second, upon recognition of a fundamental right of 
abortion, it has been suggested that such uncertainty will inhibit 
the physicians from providing the assistance necessary for the 
woman's exercise of that right.201 
The better reasoned decisions have kept the doctrines separate 
and concentrated on the direct restriction of the woman's right 
to abortion as a matter of overbreadth, apart from the physician's 
uncertain ty. These decisions tie their logic more tightly to the 
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constitutional stature of the woman's right.202 They reason (1) 
that the basic constitutional right is a qualified and regulable one; 
(2) that the state may regulate it by compulsory procedures for 
public health purposes and, conceivably, curtail it for a compel-
ling state interest; (3) but that the general statutory restriction 
of that right not limited to a demonstrable compelling interest 
unnecessarily abridges the constitutionally protected abortion 
along with the unprotected abortion. Overbreadth, then, ad-
dresses the statute's direct restriction of the woman's constitu-
tional right. Vagueness addresses the impact of the statute on the 
uncertain mind and inhibited judgment of the doctor. The dis-
tinction remains significant because vagueness is curable by 
statutory construction while overbreadth involves the funda-
mental right of the woman and is typically fatal to the statute. 
E. Professional Action as State Action 
One final facet of the professional dilemma arises from the 
substitution of the doctor for the state in the regulation of abor-
tion practices.203 In jurisdictions where the law delegates the 
abortion decision to hospital committees or corresponding medi-
cal bodies, those organizations stand in the stead of the state and 
consequently may not unnecessarily restrict the grounds for 
abortion any more than overbroad legislation might. Like the 
state, medical bodies may attach reasonable procedural regula-
tions and limit grounds directly to the extent of a subordinating 
state interest. In the meantime they stand as the state in relation 
to a fundamental personal right. Or, in effect, the judgment of the 
profession at large is protected against that of any controlling 
segment inclined to restrict the woman's right. 
Perhaps the ultimate professional dilemma in abortion is not 
legal so much as logistical. It remains to be seen whether the 
medical profession, after a victory in law, could muster the re-
sources to implement a positive concept of health and supply safe 
abortion in the numbers in which it would be requested. Here 
again, professional action will undoubtedly take the form of state 
action. 
VII. THE FATHER 
The Chief Justice: "Have you given any thought to the right of 
the father?" 
Mr. Dorsen (counsel for defendant physician): "I have given a 
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great deal of thought to that, I have come to the conclusion that it 
is only the woman's right."204 
This brief colloquy during the oral argument of the Vuitch 
case before the Supreme Court aptly summarizes the legal discus-
sion of the rights of the father. The most prominent quality of 
the paternal rights is their uncertainty. Commentators favoring 
the legal restriction of abortion typically advert to the father's 
rights in latent opposition to his wife's abortion.205 Occasionally 
a proponent of liberalized abortion will mention their potentiality 
out of reservations about abortion upon request.206 
The cases have devoted even less attention to a legal rational-
ization of distinctly paternal rights. As yet the courts of record 
have had no adversary father before them to frame the issue of his 
rights. With married couples before them, the courts have treated 
the concurring husband and wife as a unit and located all an-
tagonistic interests in either the fetus or the state.207 Conse-
quently the husband's interest has been subsumed under the 
woman's fundamental right to abortion. Every major recent 
decision has been drawn to a consideration of Griswold and its 
characterization of basic "marital rights." Typically the courts 
proceed from Griswold to hold for or against "the woman's" 
right to abortion. Whether the husband's interest is discarded in 
the transition from the Griswold "marital right" to the "woman's 
fundamental right" of abortion is uncertain. The weight of deci-
sional language supports the purely personal, rather than the 
jointly held, nature of the right to abortion. Of the seven reported 
decisions recognizing the basic right, only Roe v. Wade has in-
volved a man-and-wife among the litigants, and it recognized 
the fundamental right of both "single women and married 
persons . .• to choose whether to have children.''208 [Emphasis 
added]. The Belous case involved a girl unmarried at the time of 
her abortion. Vuitch does not reveal the marital status of the 
woman. Nor does Babbitz. Bolton involved pregnant women, 
married and single; Page an unmarried woman; and Doe v. Scott 
a single sixteen-year-old rape victim. Decisions not discussing the 
marital status of the woman can be assumed not to have found 
it necessary to their holding in favor of her fundamental personal 
right to early abortion.209 Those speaking to both single and 
married women have acknowledged the right without distinc-
tion, a further indication of its personal nature.2lO And those 
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addressing the abortion of unmarried women must be recog-
nizing a personal, not marital, right.2l1 
Nor does a father receive recognition in the decisions rejecting 
a constitutional right to abortion. Each of these, Steinberg, Rosen 
and Hodgson, subordinated the woman's right to the fetal right 
to life. 
The upshot of the recent decisions, then, is that the funda-
mental right attaches personally to the woman. It would follow 
that a husband could not curtail that right, could not compel the 
preferred use of her body, any more than the state or fetal in-
terests might. Still, whatever his rights, they have not been so 
much rejected as ignored. 
Most likely, a spousal interest against a wife's abortion would 
emerge not as a constitutional right but as a procedural hurdle 
for the woman. State statutory schemes might require a husband's 
consent in the form of a reasonable regulation of the exercise of 
her right to abort. All approving courts have allowed for reason-
able regulation or restriction commensurate with a compelling 
state interest. In the form of a mere procedural requirement, a 
husband's consent could not bar the exercise of the woman's 
constitutional right. It remains to be seen whether a father's 
dissent could embody a sufficiently compelling state interest, 
possibly in the collective welfare of the family unit. Cases of 
paternal opposition might require individual scrutiny as matters 
of medical judgment. The burden would lie with the father and 
the state to override the woman's choice and compel the birth of 
an unwanted child. Correlative criteria, such as the stage of 
fetal life and the danger to the woman, would come into play. 
Possibly a combination of (1) danger to the mother (2) advanced 
fetal life and (3) paternal dissent would produce a medical deci-
sion subordinating the woman's right of choice. In this form the 
father's will has become a medical criterion weighed for the 
reasonable restriction of his wife's fundamental right. The rea-
sonableness of such a criterion appears supported by the obvious 
influence of the father's mind upon the family environment into 
which the child would or would not be born. In the face of a 
dissolution of the family, the father's influence and interest would 
be greatly diminished. 
As a practical matter serious disagreement between husband 
and wife on such a basic family decision should be rare in the 
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ongoing marriage. Serious antagonism over the question of the 
child's birth bodes ill for its reception and environment, and 
probably constitutes a sociomedical criterion for the medical 
decision itself. Often the dissolution of the family will be immi-
nent. One writer reports a 1967 lower California court case in 
which a husband, divorcing his wife, sought to have the court 
rule unconstitutional the law permitting his wife's hospital abor-
tion on the ground that it deprived the father and the fetus of 
due process.212 The court avoided his claim on several grounds. 
I t held (1) that the issue was one for medical rather than legal 
judgment; (2) that the wife's rights superseded the husband's; 
(3) and that, in simultaneously seeking divorce, the husband had 
forfeited his "normal family rights." Each of these three grounds 
offers a rationale to courts preferring the woman's right. 
Another prominent medical writer cites cases undermining the 
practical value of a husband's power of veto.213 His experience 
suggests (1) that disagreement reflects serious existing marital 
strain; (2) that a woman, intent upon abortion, will achieve it 
fraudulently or illegally if necessary; (3) and that disagreement, 
whatever the result, portends later disruption of the family in 
which the child would have been reared. 
VIII. THE STATE 
A. Powers 
No court recognizing the woman's right to abortion has sug-
gested that it is absolute; all have suggested that the law may re-
strict that right for a compelling state interest and regulate the 
manner of its exercise as an application of the police power.214 
Thus far no court favoring the woman has found a compelling 
state interest to justify the general prohibition of abortion with 
only prescribed exceptions for the preservation of the woman's 
life or life-and-health. In striking down restrictive statutes the 
courts have rejected a number of purported state interests as 
insufficient. They have found the nineteenth century statutory 
purpose to protect the woman from dangerous surgery no longer 
valid. 215 Nor has the deterrence of sexual promiscui ty amounted 
to a satisfactory social interest.216 The state's interest in the pro-
tection of fetal life has received the most respectful consideration. 
Still, that interest during the early stages of pregnancy has usu-
ally been subordinated to the woman's right of choice.217 In 
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contrast, the courts sustaining restrictive statutes have affirmed 
an overriding state interest in the protection of fetal life as a 
justifiable legislative determination218 or as a duty to protect 
"life" within the meaning of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.219 
B. Duties 
The courts acknowledging the fundamental nature of the 
woman's right have nevertheless invariably mentioned the state's 
public health interest and police power to regulate the manner of 
the performance of abortion. Without doubt the state may impose 
two classes of conditions upon the exercise of the right of abor-
tion: first, the requirement that the operation be performed in a 
medically safe manner, by qualified licensed physicians in a 
hospital or clinical facility;220 second, the requirement that the 
woman's decision to exercise the right be a deliberative one, made 
only after prescribed medical consultation and counsel for each 
case.221 
Thus far the courts favoring a constitutional right of abortion 
have confined themselves to the foregoing conclusions. The 
difficult implications of such a right remain unresolved. Even if it 
affirms such a right, the Supreme Court will necessarily leave 
such implications to legislative resolution. The foremost of these 
remain (1) the time dimension of the right of abortion during 
pregnancy; and (2) the equal provision of abortion facilities for 
the exercise of such a fundamental right. 
The time dimension has troubled each court, and most have 
restricted their holding to a right of abortion during the early 
stages of pregnancy.222 The most appropriate resolution of this 
question is likely to come through judicial deference for legisla-
tive judgment, and, in turn, legislative deference for medical 
judgment as a delegated regulation of abortion. The time dimen-
sion as a case-by-case medical decision would rest in medical 
discretion. 
The second implication of a constitutional right to abortion 
will require the state to make facilities for its exercise available 
on an equal basis to all segments of the population. The right 
will be valueless without the facilities for its exercise. To obviate 
equal protection claims the state will be required to subsidize the 
poor. While the courts were largely unimpressed with equal pro-
tection arguments offered against restrictive statutes, several 
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were sensitive to the emergence of such a public responsibility 
in tandem with a right to abortion.223 As a matter of simple public 
health policy the provision of basic medical treatment would 
include abortion as well, once the criminal prohibitions had 
fallen. The social interest in the displacement of the underground 
abortion industry by public facilities would be incontrovertible 
once abortion had acquired constitutional sanction. 
CONCLUSION: A LEGISLATIVE ACCOMMODATION 
OF INTERESTS 
In less than two years the campaign against restrictive abor-
tion law in the courts has dramatically outdistanced the more 
noticeable efforts in the state legislatures.224 Controversy in 
legislation has centered on the substitution of the Model Code 
provisions for the traditional preservation-of-life or preservation-
of-life-and-health provisions. Meanwhile adjudication has pro-
duced a body of decisions holding abortion in the early stages of 
pregnancy to be a constitutional right abridge able only to the 
extent of a compelling state interest. Such decisions would in-
validate the Model Act itself for unconstitutional overbreadth. 
If the Supreme Court now sanctions this significant change in the 
law, the legislatures will face the prospect of thorough statutory 
revision to obviate potential overbreadth. The fact that the 
typical abortion statute is not unconstitutionally vague under the 
V uitch decision does not respond to the independent charge of 
over bread tho 
Like the lower courts, the Supreme Court need only decide 
the narrow question whether the constitutional right to abortion 
exists. The reasonable regulation of that right is then left to the 
legislatures. Such regulation must accommodate the interests of 
the woman and her family, the fetus, the medical profession, and 
the state. The state's interests have a dual character: to restrict 
the performance of abortion for overriding reasons; and to 
facilitate its exercise in proper cases, especially in order to prevent 
the unequal availability of abortion or to curb the underground 
abortion industry or to supplement contraceptive birth control 
programs. 
The frustration of the medical profession under restrictive law 
has moved some of its members to call for the withdrawal of 
regulation in favor of a private physician-and-patient relation-
ship and decision.225 Typically such proposals are qualified by 
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just such recommendation as the courts have suggested as rea-
sonable regulation: (1) performance by registered physicians in 
accredited hospitals; (2) consultation for a deliberative decision; 
(3) a time limit coming from 12 to 20 weeks of pregnancy; (4) 
a massive expansion of medical facilities to absorb the request 
for abortion. In short, the suggested withdrawal of legal regula-
tion is illusory. 
Abortion on request or "on demand" will likewise prove an 
illusion. No nation has repealed all its abortion laws. Each has 
merely substituted regulatory for prohibitory laws. "Private 
acts with ascertainable public consequences" have nowhere 
ceased to be "a matter oflegitimate concern for the public and a 
legitimate subject for regulation."226 The public consequences of 
private abortion decisions obviously include the birth rate, the 
practice of medicine, the allocation of health resources and the 
existing policies of contraceptive birth control. 
The courts and the medical and legal commentators have sug-
gested at least an outline of the major elements of a regulatory 
accommodation of the main interests of each party. 
A. The Woman 
In recognition of the woman's right, abortion on request might 
be permitted up to the point where medical danger becomes a 
concern, normally at about the 12-week mark. Thereafter greater 
justification could be required for the satisfaction of the perform-
ing doctor. Medical judgment on a case-by-case basis would 
prevail. 
To provide for the free and intelligent exercise of the woman's 
right of choice, the state might require formal counseling (1) to 
determine the voluntariness of her decision, (2) to inform her of 
the nature of the operation and its medical consequences, (3) and 
to inform her of the feasible alternatives to abortion in her case, 
such as marriage and psychological counseling, housing assis-
tance, mothers' aid, and so on. As a result of her decision, the 
state might offer either free abortion and post-operative care or 
free delivery and post-natal care. After abortion or birth the 
government could provide contraceptive counseling to forestall 
the need for repeated abortions. 
The interests of the father might receive express statutory 
mention as a criterion, though not conclusive, for the medical 
decision to perform the abortion after the twelve-week point. 
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B. Fetal Life 
To protect the fetal interest in continued development, the 
law might follow the conditional 12-week limit with an absolute 
20-week deadline, overcome only by the necessity to preserve 
the woman's life, as judged by the performing physician. 
C. The Medical Profession 
Criminal sanctions against doctors could be removed. As 
foreshadowed by the Vuitch decision, greater deference would be 
allowed for medical judgment; good faith would be presumed; 
and malpractice standards applied to discipline doctors found in 
violation of the statutory scheme, especially in the promotion 
of doctor shopping for the performance of unjustifiably late or 
dangerous abortions. 
Statutory provisions would give express respect to personal 
and professional beliefs. A conscience clause would affirm the 
freedom of doctors and nurses to withhold their services on 
moral grounds. And other provisions could enumerate, not ex-
haustively, the plain medical grounds on which a doctor could 
refuse an abortion. 
D. The State 
The state's police powers and public responsibilities are im-
plicit in the foregoing provisions. It may require the performance 
of abortion by trained personnel in hospitals only, continue the 
criminality of unskilled abortion, and require counseling as a 
condition to the performances of an abortion. The looming public 
responsibility of the state would be the provision of adequate 
facilities and services for the equal availability of abortion to all 
segments of the population. 
The legislative task would require a difficult and comprehensive 
effort. Some legislatures would be outstripping the popular sup-
port desired for such a program, and foot dragging would not be 
unlikely. The courts are neither required nor permitted to en-
tertain these imponderable considerations in constitutional 
adjudication. Nonetheless the array of abortion cases on the 
Supreme Court's docket implicate just such massive legislative 
revision of the law. It remains to be seen next whether the 
courts have carried the day. Abortion as a matter of constitu-
tionallaw and public health awaits at least one more decision of 
the Supreme Court. 
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